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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TESTAMENTARY RACIAL
OR RELIGIOUS RESTRAINTS ON MARRIAGE
By JUDSON A. CRANE*
There have been recently decided two cases involving restraints on
marriage imposed by testamentary trust provisions. They are United States
National Bank of Portland v. Snodgrass,1 and In the Matter of the Petition
of Tanburn, re Will of Rosenthal.'
In the Snodgrass case the testamentary trustee under the will of Rine-
hart sought a judgment declaring the validity and correct interpretation of
a will which provided that the testator's daughter should on reaching the
age of 32 take the corpus of a trust amounting to over $15,000, provided
she had not before reaching that age embraced the Catholic faith or married
a man of that faith. Prior to reaching the age of 32 in 1951 she had, in 1944,
twelve years after the death of the testator, married a man of the Catholic
faith. It was held that the provisions effecting a forfeiture were valid and
that the corpus passed to other beneficiaries by gifts over. This was a case
of first impression in Oregon.
In the Tanburn case the testator Rosenthal had by his will created a
power of appointment in his grandson, who exercised the power as to corpus
in favor of his daughter, the petitioner, subject to certain life estates. The
will provided that no legacy, devise, power of appointment or of disposition
given to any descendent of the testator should take effect if such descendent
married a person not born in the Jewish faith and of Jewish blood. The
estate appointed to Jean Tanburn, the petitioner, testator's great-grand-
daughter, had not yet vested in possession as prior life estates were still in
effect. The interest appointed exceeded $600,000 in value. She became en-
gaged to marry a man not of the Jewish faith or blood, and filed a petition
in the Surrogate's Court of the County of New York, asking for construc-
tion of the will of Rosenthal, the creator of the trust and donor of the power.
The Surrogate held that if petitioner married as she proposed to do her
rights as appointee would be forfeited, as reading the whole will it was
apparent that the intent of the testator was that disability of descendents
who married non-Jews to take extended not only to legacies and devises,
but also to appointments, even though not expressly mentioned.3
The decree of the Surrogate was reversed by Appellate Division, First
Department, by a majority of three to two. It was held that appointees
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were not for this purpose legatees or devises, and the failure to include them
along with legatees, devisees and donees of powers, excluded them from the
provision, the will being obviously drawn with painstaking care. This de-
cision was affirmed per curiam by the Court of Appeals, three justices dis-
senting.
In both of these cases the validity of the restraint on marriage was
attacked in argument of counsel, on constitutional grounds, relying on
Shelley v. Kraemer4 and cases which follow it. The New York courts as-
sumed partial restraints on marriage were valid and not against public
policy The Oregon court discusses the matter at length, citing and follow-
ing the many authorities approving such restraints, and disposed of the con-
stitutional issue raised in the Shelley case by distinguishing state action
from individual conduct.
In Shelley v Kraemer' the Supreme Court on certiorari reversed the
decree of the Missouri court enforcing by injunction a restriction by cove-
nant against use and occupancy by any person not of the Causasian race.
This was followed by Barrows v Jackson,6 refusing recovery of damages
for violation of such a covenant. The New York judges did not refer to the
constitutional question as by the majority of the judges the restriction was
not applicable. It was assumed that such restraints were valid, but doubt
as to validity may have had some weight in the construction of the will of
Rosenthal. Judge Bodem in the Appellate division, writing the majority
opinion, affirmed per curiam in the Court of Appeals, stated.
"While it has been held that 'Conditions in partial restrint of marriage,
which merely impose reasonable restrictions upon marriage, are not against
public policy ' (citing New York cases) certainly there is not involved
herein any affirmative public policy which would impel us to strain to fash-
ion a testamentary intent from such speculative and muddled ingredients." 7
The Oregon Court cited many authorities from other states approving
the sort of restraint involved and disposed of the constitutional issue by
quoting from Shelley v Kraemer" "That Amendment (Fourteenth) erects
no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrong-
ful.,,8
Two questions appear. First, is the action of the court, as in the Oregon
case, state action or individual action? Second, if it is state action is it
unconstitutionally discriminatory?
As to the first question, it is submitted that when a court construes the
4334 U.S. 1, 3 A.L.R.2d 441 (1948).
5 See note 4 supra.
6346 U.S. 249 (1953), aff'g 112 Cal.App.2d 534, 247 P.2d 99.
7 307 N.Y. at 720, 121 N.E.2d at 542.
8 See note 4 supra.
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meaning and validity of a testamentary provision, and decrees distribution
of a trust estate which results in a beneficiary being divested of a vested
interest by operation of a cqndition subsequent, validity of which is judi-
cially upheld, or in failure of an interest to vest by reason of non-perform-
ance of a condition precedent, held to be a valid condition, there is state
action. This position is supported by the Shelley and Barrows cases.
Secondly, it is submitted that state action in restraint of marriage be-
tween persons of different races or religions is in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and unconstitutional. We are speaking as of today in the light
of the recent decisions of the courts condemning discrimination and segre-
gation. Freedom to marry is as much a constitutional right as freedom to
occupy real estate and to go to school. This has been recently recognized
in California in the case of Perez v. Sharp.9 In this case it was held that a
writ of mandamus should be issued to compel the County Clerk of Los An-
geles County to issue a marriage license to a white person and a Negro.
The miscegenation statutes of over a hundred years standing were held
unconstitutional. This involved racial discrimination.
Justice Edmunds, writing the opinion of three of the justices, would
apparently feel the same way about religious discrimination, as he said. "If
miscegenous marriages can be prohibited because of tensions suffered by
the progeny, mixed religious unions could be prohibited on the same
ground."' 1 There are miscegenation statutes in many states, and the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court appears to be the first to declare such legislation
unconstitutional. There do not appear to be any statutes prohibiting mar-
riage between persons of different religious faiths. Such statutes would
certainly be invalid. They would be recognized as quite unreasonable and
unsupported by considerations of public policy
One may make an outright gift to whom he pleases, and for reasons of
his own, fail to provide by intervivos gift or by will for the natural objects
of his bounty What is objected to is the exercise of economic pressure by
restrictions in will or intervivos trusts in the attempt to enforce, long after
a testator or trust creator is dead, compliance by his descendents with his
racial and religious prejudices. Under present case law the ancestor may
die with the assurance that long after his death, within the period of the
rule against perpetuities, his efforts will be backed up by the aid of the state
through judicial action in the administration of his estate.', This, it is sub-
mitted, is unconstitutional interference by state action with the exercise
of the fundamental rights of freedom of religion and freedom to marry.
932 Cal.2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 1948), noted 62 HARv. L. REv. 307.
10 32 Cal.2d at 727, 198 P.2d at 25.
11 Cases collected m annotation, 25 A.L.R. 1523. See also 1A BOGERT, TRUSTS § 211.
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